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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This being an appeal from a conviction of a third degree 
felony, the Utah Court of Appeals is granted original appellate 
jurisdiction over this case by Section 78-2a-3 (f) and Rule 26 
(2) (a) U.R.Cr.P. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
FIRST ISSUE: Whether the Court improperly admitted testimo-
ny concerning certain offensive statements made by Defendant to 
sheriff's deputies, where Defendant had filed a Motion in Limine 
before trial and objected to the testimony at trial on the basis 
that such statements were irrelevant and highly prejudicial. 
Standard of Appellate Review: This is a ruling on evidence 
and the Trial Court's ruling is to be upheld unless clearly 
erroneous. 
SECOND ISSUE: Whether the Court erred in denying 
Defendant's Motion to Sever his trial from the trial of Co-
Defendant , Adderman. 
Standard of Appellate Review: A denial of severance will be 
reversed only if it affirmatively shows that a defendant's right 
to a fair trial has been impaired. 
THIRD ISSUE: Whether the Court erred in refusing to give 
Defendant's requested jury instruction on what constitutes 
"injury" to a jail. 
Standard of Appellate Review: This issue requires an inter-
pretation of Section 76-8-418, U.C.A., (1953), as amended, and is 
therefore a question of law, reviewable without deference to the 
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Trial Court's rulings. State v_^  Chindgren, 777 P. 2d 527. 
FOURTH ISSUE: Whether the Court erred in refusing to give a 
jury instruction on the lesser included offense of Criminal 
Mischief, a Class A Misdemeanor. 
Standard of Appellate Review: This issue presents a 
question of law which is reviewable without deference to the 
ruling of the Trial Court. ibid. 
FIFTH ISSUE: Was the Court's denial of Defendant's Motion 
for Production of the Transcript of the Preliminary Hearing a 
denial of Defendant's right to equal protection under the laws, a 
denial of Defendant's right to due process, a denial of 
Defendant's right to confrontation of the witnesses against him, 
and a denial of Defendant's rights provided by Section 77-32-1, 
and Section 77-32-5, U.C.A., (1953), as amended. 
Standard of Appellate Review: This issue is a question of 
law and the Trial Court's decision should not be given any spe-
cial deference. Bountiful v^ Riley, 784 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES and RULES 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States 
Amendment V: No person shall be held to answer for a capi-
tal, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land 
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
Amendment VI: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impar-
tial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and 
to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Amendment XIV: Section 1. All persons born or naturalised 
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 2 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free 
governments are founded on their authority for their equal pro-
tection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform 
their government as the public welfare may require. 
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Constitution of Otah, Article 1, Section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance 
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
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Utah Code Annotated, (1953), Section 76-6-106 (c) 
(1) A person commits criminal mischief if: 
(a) Under circumstances not amounting to arson, he dam-
ages or destroys property with the intention of defrauding an 
insurer; or 
(b) He intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the 
property of another and thereby: 
(i) Recklessly endangers human life; or 
(ii) Recklessly causes or threatens a substantial intex"-
ruption or impairment of any public utility service; or 
(c) He intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the 
property of another (d) . 
(2) (a) A violation of Section 76-6-106 (l)(a) is a felony 
of the third degree. 
(b) A violation of Section 76-6-106 (l)(b) is a class 
A misdemeanor (c) . 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953), Section 76-8-418 
Every person who willfully and intentionally breaks down, 
pulls down, or otherwise destroys or injures any public jail or 
other place of confinement is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree. 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953), Section 77-32-1 
The following are minimum standards to be provided by each 
county, city and town for the defense of indigent persons in 
criminal cases in the courts and various administrative bodies of 
the state: 
5 
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent person who faces the 
substantial probability of the deprivation of his liberty; 
(2) Afford timely representation by competent legal coun-
sel ; 
(3) Provide the investigatory and other facilities neces-
sary for a complete defense; 
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the 
client; and 
(5) Include the taking of a first appeal of right and the 
prosecuting of other remedies before or after a conviction, 
considered by the defending counsel to be in the interest of 
justice except for other and subsequent discretionary appeals or 
discretionary writ proceedings. 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953), Section 77-32-5 
The expenses of printing or typewriting briefs on first 
appeals of right on behalf of an indigent defendant, as well as 
depositions and other transcripts shall be paid by the state, 
county, or municipal agency that prosecuted the defendant at 
trial. 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953), Section 78-2a-3 (f) 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and 
decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, in-
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eluding jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(f) appeals from district court in criminal cases, except 
those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 9 
(a) Two or more offenses may be charged in the same 
indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if 
the offenses charged arise out of a criminal episode as defined 
in Section 76-1-401, U.C.A., 1953. A felony offense and a misde-
meanor offense may be charged in the same indictment or informa-
tion if: 
(1) they arise out of a criminal episode; and 
(2) the defendant is afforded a preliminary hearing with 
respect to the misdemeanor along with the felony offense. 
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same 
indictment or information if they are alleged to have participat-
ed in the same act or conduct or in the same criminal episode. 
Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts togeth-
er or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in 
each count. 
When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any 
offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the court in its 
discretion, on motion or otherwise, orders separate trials con-
sistent with the interests of justice. 
(c) The court may order two or more indictments or informa-
tions or both to be tried together if the offenses, and the 
defendants, if there is more than one, could have been joined in 
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a single indictment or information. The procedure shall be the 
same as if the prosecution were under such single indictment or 
information. 
(d) If it appears that a defendant or the prosecution is 
prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or defendants in an indict-
ment or information, or by a joinder for trial together, the 
court shall order an election of separate trials of separate 
counts, or grant a severance of defendants, or provide such other 
relief as justice requires. 
A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants 
is waived if the motion is not made at least five days before 
trial. In ruling on a motion by defendant for severance, the 
court may order the prosecutor to disclose any statements made by 
the defendants which he intends to introduce in evidence at the 
trial. 
Utah. Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall 
disclose to the defense upon request the following material or 
information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the de-
fendant or codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or code-
fendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate 
the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or 
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mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines 
on good cause shown should be made available to the defendant in 
order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as 
practicable following the filing of charges and before the de-
fendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a continuing 
duty to make disclosure....(c), (d), (e), (f). 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it 
is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed 
to comply with this rule, the court may order such party to 
permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or 
prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it 
may enter such other order as it deems just under the circum-
stances .... 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 26 (2)(a) 
(1) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of the 
court from which the appeal is taken a notice of appeal, stating 
the order or judgment appealed from, and by serving a copy of it 
on the adverse party or his attorney of record. Proof of service 
of the copy shall be filed with the court. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict 
or plea.... 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Article IV, Rule 402 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
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provided by the Constitution of the United States or the Consti-
tution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by 
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which 
is not relevant is not admissible. 
Dtah Rules of Evidence, Article IV, Rule 403 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presen-
tation of cumulative evidence. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Defendant, along with a Co-Defendant, was tried on one 
count of Injuring a Jail, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Section 76-8-418, U.C.A., (1953), as amended. A trial was held 
before a jury in the Seventh Judicial District Court for Carbon 
County, State of Utah. The Defendant was found guilty of the 
charge, and this is an appeal from that conviction. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT. 
The crime is alleged to have occurred on or about November 
7, 1989, but no charges were filed until January 2, 1990. Pre-
liminary Hearing was held on January 22, 1990 and the Circuit 
Court bound the case over to the District Court for Carbon Coun-
ty, State of Utah, for further proceedings. The Defendant, 
together with two (2) co-defendants, was arraigned before the 
Seventh Judicial District Court on February 20, 1990, and entered 
a plea of not guilty. The Court set trial for March 14-15, 1990, 
and then heard Defendant's Motion for Production of Transcript of 
the Preliminary Hearing. The Court denied Defendant's motion, 
instructing Counsel that Counsel wouldn't need a transcript if he 
had taken proper notes. 
After making two (2) written requests for Discovery, on 
March 9, 1990, Counsel was made aware of a letter written by one 
of the Co-Defendants wherein that Co-Defendant admitted that he 
had intentionally caused the flooding and that he was the only 
party who had done so. Counsel for Defendant/Appellant filed a 
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Motion to Sever on March 9, 1990 and by telephone conference on 
March 12, 1990, the Seventh Judicial District Court Judge denied 
the motion. Just prior to trial on March 14, 1990, Counsel for 
Defendant/Appellant renewed his motion on the record (T.2), and 
after discussion between the Court and Counsel for Defendant, the 
Court again denied Defendant's Motion to Sever (T.4). 
After conversation with the Prosecutor on March 13, 1990, in 
which Counsel for Defendant/Appellant discovered that the Prose-
cutor intended to introduce testimony from two (2) deputy sher-
iffs concerning statements made by the Defendant to them, Counsel 
for Defendant/Appellant filed a Motion in Limine the morning of 
March 14, 1990. Said Motion was filed before the beginning of 
trial but was not filed more than five (5) days before trial. 
Because of the lateness in filing, the Court refused to hear the 
motion, even though no inquiry was made of Counsel for the State 
to see if he objected and while the Motion in Limine is in the 
Trial Court file, there isn't any reference to it in the tran-
script of the proceedings. 
On March 14, 1990, just before trial, one of the three Co-
Defendants, Kenneth Mark Smith, changed his plea and entered a 
plea of guilty. Mr. Smith waived his statutory rights concerning 
sentencing and was immediately sentenced (T.9). Defendant/Appel-
lant, together with the one remaining Defendant, Jerry Lee Adder-
man, was tried before a jury with the jury returning a verdict of 
guilty to the charge. Defendant was sentenced to serve 0-5 years 
in the Utah State Prison with the sentence to be served consecu-
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tively with another sentence that Defendant was already serving 
in the Utah State Prison. 
C. RELEVANT FACTS 
On November 7, 1989, Carbon County Jailer, Jay Nelson, was 
on duty at the County Jail, which is attached to the County 
Courthouse. Mr. Nelson was also taking calls coming in to the 
Courthouse from persons inquiring about election results (T.50). 
At approximately 10:30 p.m., Mr. Nelson heard a disturbance 
in the jail, which is located on a second floor above the 
Sheriff's office, which is located on the ground floor of the 
building (T.55). Mr. Nelson sent a deputy sheriff, Scott Henrie, 
to investigate and Deputy Henrie soon returned, informing Mr. 
Nelson that one or more of the prisoners wished to make a tele-
phone call. Approximately an hour later, Mr. Nelson went to the 
jail area, told the prisoners it was too late to make a telephone 
call and to go to bed. The prisoners refused to leave the T.V. 
area and go to their cells, until Mr. Nelson brought two deputy 
sheriffs to require them to do so and all prisoners then went to 
their cells. 
There were seven prisoners in the jail on that date, with 
Defendant Jaimez housed alone in Cell #1, Defendant Adderman and 
John M. Palacios in Cell #2, Abel Madrid and Kenneth W. Wilson in 
Cell #3 and Arnold Rowley and Kenneth M. Smith in Cell #4. 
All four cells are located in a jail facility constructed 
and located on a second floor above the Sheriff's office. There 
are two entrances into the lower floor, one for the general 
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public and the other, which leads directly to the booking area is 
used solely by officers bringing arrestees to the jail. The 
second story jciil floor consists of a concrete floor, concrete 
walls, steel bars and doors, cell bunks whicii are connected GO 
the walls and stainless steel sinks and commodes. The first 
floor is generally used as a Sheriff's office and consists of a 
waiting room, various offices, a toilet room, some cells reserved 
for women prisoners and a multipurpose room (T.77, 73). 
Shortly after the prisoners were confined to their cells for 
the night, Mr. Nelson and others noticed water dripping from the 
ceiling on the second floor. The amount of water coming through 
the ceiling increased until it was difficult to contain and the 
water caused damage to the ceiling tiles of the multipurpose room 
and required that jail personnel retain the services of a carpet 
cleaning company to clean up the water in the multipurpose room. 
Apparently, no water came through the ceiling of other parts of 
the Sheriff's office. 
Shortly after Mr. Helson noticed the water coming thrDugn 
the ceiling tile, he and some sheriff's deputies -went upstairs to 
the jail and turned off the valve to the waterlines going to the 
four cells. Subsequent to turning off the water, and with the 
aid of two sheriff's deputies, the prisoners were temporarily 
removed from*their cells. Defendant/Appellant Jaimec was first 
removed from his cell and placed in the drunk tank while all of 
his belongings were removed from the cell and placed in the 
kitchen area. He was then returned to his cell and locked in it 
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for the night. After Mr. Jaimez' cell was cleared and Mr. Jaimez 
returned to his cell, the sheriff's deputies then moved on to 
Cell #2, removed the prisoners from that cell, placing them in 
the drunk tank and then removed their belongings to the kitchen 
area. After doing that, they then returned the prisoners to Cell 
#2 and moved on to Cells #3 and 4, following the same procedure 
with the prisoners in those cells. The second floor jail area 
was kept secure at all times, was not damaged by the water, and 
the prisoners were never removed from it. They remained there 
throughout the night and were secure. 
The only apparent damage to the entire building was to the 
ceiling of the multipurpose room of the Sheriff's office and that 
damage did not interfere with the operation of the jail or the 
confinement of the prisoners. That multipurpose room was not 
being used to confine any prisoners or arrestees during the night 
in question, (T. 88), and an adjacent booking area that may have 
been used for the purpose of processing any arrestees or prison-
ers was left undamaged. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
FIRST ISSUE: The Court improperly admitted testimony con-
cerning certain offensive statements allegedly made by 
Defendant/Appellant to Deputy Sheriff Cowan. The statements 
(T.110), were not probative, they were irrelevant, and highly 
prejudicial and had such an effect on the jury as to influence 
the outcome of the trial. Their admission was contrary to Rules 
402 and 403, U.R.E. The Court should have required a Proffer of 
Evidence out of the presence of the jury, as the Court had done 
prior to the admission of other evidence (T.62), and Defense 
Counsel had previously made such a request concerning Deputy 
Cowan's testimony concerning statements made by the Defendant (T. 
102). 
Before trial, the Court was advised that the issue of admis-
sibility would be raised because Counsel for Defendant filed a 
Motion in Limine to prevent the introduction of the statements. 
That Motion was filed less than five (5) days before trial, 
because Counsel had only just learned the Prosecutor intended to 
introduce the statements. The Court would not entertain the 
Motion, but was, nevertheless, aware of the nature of the state-
ments prior to their introduction from the witness stand. Be-
cause of the prejudicial effect of the statements on the jury, 
the introduction of those statements is reversible error. 
SECOND ISSUE: Sometime prior to the arraignment on February 
20, 1990, Co-Defendant, Jerry Lee Adderman, wrote a letter to the 
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Editor of the Sun Advocate newspaper in which he confessed to 
causing the damage and stated that Defendant Jaimez had no in-
volvement in causing the damage. Although the Prosecutor re-
ceived a copy of the letter shortly after it was received by the 
Editor of the Sun Advocate, the Prosecutor did not make that 
exculpatory information available to Counsel for Defendant Jaimez 
or the other Defendants in the case. Only after Defense Counsel 
had filed two written requests for Discovery, was a copy of the 
letter given to Counsel. Counsel for Defendant/Appellant, filed 
a Motion to Sever so that Defendant Adderman could proceed with 
his trial and then be available to testify in 
Defendant/Appellant's behalf at a subsequent trial. Because 
Defendant Adderman had decided to contest the allegations, he 
obviously no longer intended to accept responsibility for the 
damage caused to the jail and until his trial was completed, 
Defendant/Appellant Jaimez would not be able to use Defendant 
Adderman as a witness in his own behalf. Because of Defendant 
Adderman's prior admission, it was obvious that he would not be 
taking the witness stand to deny the allegations and his decision 
to not take the witness stand had an adverse effect upon Defend-
ant Jaimez, who was being tried with him for the same offense. 
Rule 9 (d), U.R.Cr.P., requires severance when a defendant is 
prejudiced by joinder with another defendant. In this case, the 
joinder of Defendant/Appellant Jaimez with Defendant Adderman, 
prejudiced the defense of Defendant/Appellant Jaimez and the 
Court's refusal to sever the trial of the two Defendants is 
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reversible error. 
THIRD ISSUE: The Court erred in refusing to give 
Defendant/Appellant's requested Instruction #1 to the jury. That 
Instruction would require that, before any damage was considered 
to be sufficient to be considered an "injury" to the jail, that 
damage must be of equal gravity with "breaking down", "pulling 
down" or "destroying" a jail or other place of confinement. The 
use of the disjunctive "or" in combination with the term "other-
wise" is indicative of an intent by the Legislature to equate 
injures with the more specific terms of "breaks down", "pulls 
down" or "destroys". The jury should have been instructed that 
damage that did not equal breaking down, pulling down or destroy-
ing the jail did not amount to an injury to the jail. The 
Court's failure to so instruct the jury was reversible error. 
FOURTH ISSUE: Defendant was entitled to have the jury 
instructed that it could find the Defendant guilty of a lesser 
included offense of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, Section 76-6-106 (c), 
U.C.A., (1953), as amended, because the damage caused to the jail 
was not of equal gravity with breaking down, pulling down or 
destroying, Defendant should not have been found guilty of doing 
injury to a jail. However, the jury should have had an alterna-
tive to either finding the Defendant guilty of violating Section 
76-8-418, U.C.A., (1953), as amended, and simply finding the 
Defendant . not guilty of any charge and turning the Defendant 
free. Because of the testimony at trial, the jury would be 
justified in believing that the Defendant merited some punishment 
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for the resultant damage to the multipurpose squadroom, but 
absent an instruction for a lesser included offense, the jury was 
forced to either find the Defendant guilty of the felony charge, 
or to find the Defendant not guilty of any offense at all. The 
Court erred in determining that Defendant was not entitled to an 
instruction for a lesser included offense because that instruc-
tion did not embody the Defendant's theory of the case, since 
Defendant contended that he did nothing (T.230). Defendant is 
entitled to a jury instruction consistent with the evidence of 
the case and for the Court to refuse to so instruct the jury, is 
reversible error. 
FIFTH ISSUE: On February 20, 1990, following 
Defendant/Appellant's arraignment in the District Court, the 
Court denied Defendant/Appellant's Motion for the Production of 
the Transcript of the Preliminary Hearing, commenting to Defense 
Counsel that if Defense Counsel had taken proper notes, Defense 
Counsel would not need a transcript of the Preliminary Hearing. 
Defense Counsel is not obligated to explain Defendant's defense 
strategy to the Court and the Prosecutor prior to trial, and 
Defense Counsel should be free to make his own decisions as to 
what he will need to best prepare Defendant's defense. Among 
other things, the Preliminary Hearing Transcript is valuable in 
analyzing the State's case, pinpointing inconsistencies between 
the testimony of the State's various witnesses and pinpointing 
inconsistencies within the statements of each witness. Because 
Defense Counsel does not know what the testimony of the State's 
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witnesses will be during the trial, possession of the Preliminary 
Hearing Transcript is valuable in impeaching the testimony of the 
State's witnesses during trial. Without the Preliminary Hearing 
Transcript, it is impossible to impeach the testimony of the 
witnesses. 
Prosperous defendants can afford to pay the costs of produc-
tion of a Preliminary Hearing Transcript, but indigent defendants 
can not. To allow indigent defendants equal protection under the 
laws and the ability to confront witnesses against them in the 
same manner that prosperous defendants are able to, the Utah 
Legislature created Section 77-32-1 et. seq., to insure that the 
costs of such transcripts for indigent defendants would be pro-
vided and indigent defendants would receive the same protection 
that others are entitled to. The Court's refusal to grant 
Defendant's motion for Production of Preliminary Hearing Tran-
script and the payment of the cost of that transcript by the 
State denied Defendant the ability to properly prepare his de-
fense and properly confront the witnesses against him, was re-
versible error. 
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DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
FIRST ISSUE: Very shortly before trial, the Prosecutor 
informed Counsel for Defendant/Appellant that the Prosecutor 
would call Officer Jeral Cowan and Deputy Steve Raber as witness-
es to testify concerning some alleged statements made by Defend-
ant Jaimez to Officer Cowan. The statements were outrageous in 
nature and by their very content would obviously evoke a prejudi-
cial response by the jury against Defendant Jaimez. Counsel for 
Defendant filed a Motion in Limine to prevent the introduction of 
the statements and discussed the Motion with the trial Judge, who 
refused to hear the Motion because it was filed just prior to 
trial. However, the content of the statements was divulged to 
the Judge and he was aware that Counsel for Defendant intended to 
object to the introduction of the statements if the State at-
tempted to introduce at trial. 
Deputy Cowan was called to the stand as a witness and short-
ly after taking the stand, was asked if he had any conversation 
with the inmates. Counsel for Defendant objected to him answer-
ing, on the grounds of irrelevancy and the undue adverse influ-
ence the answer might have on the jury and asked that a proffer 
be made out of the presence of the jury. The Court overruled the 
objection and instructed the Prosecutor to continue, (T.102-103). 
Later, during Deputy Cowan's testimony, the Prosecutor asked 
Deputy Cowan to relate the outrageous statements to the Court and 
Defense Counsel again objected on the grounds that the statements 
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were irrelevant to the case and would have an untoward or preju-
dicial effect on the jury, (T.110). The Court overruled Defense 
Counsel's objection, did not require a proffer outside the 
presence of the jury and allowed the statements to be admitted. 
Deputy Cowan's presentation of the statements are found in the 
Trial Transcript, Page 110, Lines 20-25. 
The contents of the statements were unrelated to the offense 
charged and even if they were introduced to show that 
Defendant/Appellant was angry with Deputy Cowan, their prejudi-
cial effect on the jury so outweighed their relevance to the 
case, that it was error to allow them to be presented to the 
jury, Terry v. Zion's Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314, 
(Utah 1979). The introduction of the statements did not add 
anything to the case that could not or was not presented to the 
jury through non-prejudicial evidence. While the Trial Court is 
given considerable discretion in deciding whether or not evidence 
submitted is relevant, Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 
(Utah, 1976), and the Court may have previously decided that the 
statements were relevant, the probative value of evidence, stand-
ing alone, does not determine its admissibility, Terry v. Zion's 
Coop. Mercantile Inst., supra. The introduction of this evidence 
had an obvious, highly prejudicial effect on the minds of the 
jurors and its introduction is reversible error. Because the 
marginal probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the 
overwhelming probability of unfair prejudice and confusion of 
issues submitted to the jury, the admission clearly affected the 
substantial rights of the Defendant. 
SECOND ISSUE: Shortly after Defendant's Counsel made his 
appearance as counsel in behalf of the Defendant, the Prosecutor 
delivered copies of police reports and other information in 
possession of the Prosecutor for purposes of complying with Rule 
16, U.R.Cr.P. The Prosecutor continued, after that time, to 
divulge additional information to Defense Counsel, both verbally 
and in writing. However, the Prosecutor came in to possession of 
a written statement by Co-Defendant, Adderman, in which Defendant 
Adderman stated that he was solely responsible for the damage 
that was done in the jail that night. The Prosecutor did not 
disclose the existence of that letter to Defense Counsel and it 
wasn't until after Defense Counsel filed a second written Request 
for Discovery and personally appeared at the Prosecutor's office 
to ask if any additional information was available, that the 
Prosecutor delivered a copy of the letter to Defense Counsel on 
March 9, 1990, a few days before trial. Defendant's Counsel 
filed a Motion to Sever the trial of the Defendants and a Motion 
for Continuance of Defendant/Appellant Jaimez' trial so that 
Defendant would have adequate time to prepare for the new infor-
mation and 50 that Defendant/Appellant would have Defendant 
Adderman available to testify at Defendant Jaimez' trial. 
While Defendant Adderman had given a written statement 
admitting to the offense and taking sole responsibility for it, 
subsequent to writing the letter, Defendant Adderman decided to 
contest the allegations and during any trial with 
Defendant/Appellant Jaimez would obviously be unwilling to take 
the witness stand and confess. The joinder of the two Defendants 
therefore deprived Defendant/Appellant Jaimez of a witness who 
could be compelled to testify in Jaimez' defense and also placed 
him in a position of being a Co-Defendant in a trial in which the 
other Co-Defendant would not be taking the witness stand to 
testify in his own defense. 
The Prosecutor's failure to disclose the exculpatory 
information, after having made voluntary disclosures of evidence 
and after receiving two written requests for Discovery, could be 
considered prejudicial error, State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 
1985). 
The Trial Court had before it facts which would indicate the 
accused would be unduly prejudiced by a joint trial, because of 
the unavailability of Adderman as a witness and the Court could 
conclude that the Trial Court abused its discretion in denying 
Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Sever and Motion for Continuance, 
State v^ Miller, 177 P.2d 727, ( Utah 1947). A denial of sever-
ance should be reversed if it is affirmatively shown that a 
defendant's right to a fair trial has been impaired, State v. 
Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, (Utah 1986). 
Although a defendant is not entitled to severance of defend-
ants as a matter right, and the granting or denial of severance 
rests with the sound discretion of the trial judge, State v. 
O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896, (Utah 1986), whenever joint defendants 
have defenses that appear to be inconsistent with or to obstruct 
24 
or impede each other, the trial court should carefully examine 
requests for severance and should grant severance when there is 
any doubt as to prejudice, State v. 0'Brien, supra. Amendment VI 
of the Constitution of the United States, provides in part that, 
"the accused shall enjoy the right...to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor", and the Constitution of 
the State of Utah, Article 1, Section 12, provides in part that, 
"the accused shall have the right...to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf". Because the 
Trial Court refused to sever the defendants and grant Defendant 
Jaimez' Motion for Continuance, Defendant Jaimez was effectively 
denied the right to have Adderman testify that Adderman was 
solely responsible for the damage caused. Because the two de-
fendants were joined in the same defense, Adderman could not be 
compelled to testify against himself and the severance of the two 
defendants was the only way that Defendant Jaimez would be able 
to receive the rights guaranteed to him by the United States and 
Utah Constitutions. 
THIRD ISSUE: The evidence at trial was that, although there 
was some damage to the ceiling tiles of the first floor squad-
room, located underneath the second story jail facility, that 
there was not damage to the jail or confinement area on the 
second floor. In fact, the jail area in which all of the prison-
ers were confined, didn't suffer any damage, (T.96), and after 
the defendants were removed from their cells by the jailers and 
deputy sheriffs and the cells were cleared of any personal 
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property of the prisoners, the prisoners were returned to their 
cells where they remained through the night. During the short 
period while each prisoner was removed from his own cell, he was 
kept in a holding cell or drunk tank which was on the same floor 
and part of the same jail facility. 
Because the evidence showed that there was no damage or 
injury to the area in which the prisoners were confined and only 
some damage done to the ceiling tiles of the squadroom below, it 
was the position of the Defendant/Appellant that the amount of 
damage was insufficient to justify a conviction under Section 76-
8-418, U.C.A., (1953), as amended. 
Counsel for Defendant submitted a requested Jury Instruction 
that stated: 
Instruction # You are instructed that if you find 
from the evidence that damage was done to the jail or other place 
of confinement, that before that damage is considered sufficient 
to be considered an "injury" to the jail, that damage must be of 
equal gravity or consequence with "breaking down", "pulling down" 
or "destroying" a jail or other place of confinement. 
The Court reviewed the requested Jury Instruction on the 
record and after lengthy discussion with Counsel for Defendant, 
(T.228-230), the Court refused to submit the Instruction to the 
jury. The Court's refusal to do so was error. In State of Utah, 
in the Interest of J.L.S., a person under eighteen years- of age, 
610 P.2d 1294, (Utah 1980), the court, in interpreting similar 
language in Section 76-5-404 (1), U.C.A., (1953), as amended, 
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determined that when conduct set forth in general terms is con-
nected with specific conduct proscribed by the statute by the 
disjunctive "or" in combination with the term "otherwise", it is 
indicative of an intent to make the type of conduct referred to 
by the general term of equal gravity with the conduct referred to 
in the more specific terms. Hence, before damage is considered 
sufficient to be considered "injury" to a jail, that damage must 
be of equal gravity or consequence with "breaking down", "pulling 
down" or "destroying" a jail or other place of confinement. It 
appears from the specific terms used in the statute, that it was 
the intent of the Legislature that the jail or place of confine-
ment would be rendered incapable of confining prisoners. Cer-
tainly, the damage would need to be so extensive that the prison-
ers could not be confined there until some repairs were made. 
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, when general terms 
follows specified types of conduct the general terms are to be 
applied to things of the same kind as the specific, Lai'k v. 
Whitehead, 502 P.2d 557, (Utah 1972), Heathman v^ . Giles, 374 P.2d 
839, (Utah 1962). If any injury or damage done to a jail facili-
ty is interpreted to come within the meaning of the statute, then 
every time a prisoner is charged with violating the statute, and 
his conduct or the injury inflicted is of a lesser gravity than 
the specific terms of the statute, the defendant would be enti-
tled to a jury instruction on the lesser -included offense of 
Criminal Mischief. 
FOURTH ISSUE: After the Court had ruled on Defendant's 
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first requested Jury Instruction, the Court reviewed Defendant's 
second requested Jury Instruction, which dealt with instructing 
the jury as to the lesser included offense of Criminal Mischief. 
The Court denied the Defendant's requested Instruction #2, on the 
basis that because the Defendant's theory of the case was that he 
had done nothing, he was not entitled to have the jury instructed 
on the lesser included offense. The Court's reasoning was that 
if any damage was done, it was sufficient to constitute an of-
fense under injury to a jail and if not, the Defendant was not 
guilty of anything and could not be convicted of Criminal Mis-
chief, (T.230-231). In State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, (Utah 
1983), the court determined that the basis for determining wheth-
er a defendant's request for an instruction to the jury regarding 
a lesser included offense, is whether the evidence warrants it, 
not whether it meets with the defendant's theory of the case. 
The court reasoned that when two offenses are related because 
some of their statutory elements overlap and the greater offense 
includes proof of some or all of the overlapping elements, the 
court is obligated in instruct on the lesser included offense if 
the evidence offered provides a rational basis for a verdict 
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting 
him of the included offense. The court in Baker, went on to say 
that the court is not required to weigh the credibility of the 
evidence and decide which way the jury should decide on the 
greater or lesser charges, but only requires that the court 
decide whether there is a sufficient quantum of evidence present-
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ed to justify sending the question to the jury. 
In the present case, the jury had to decide whether the 
actions of the prisoners, including Defendant/Appellant, were 
sufficient to be considered an injury, a destroying, or a break-
ing down or a pulling down of the jail and also had to decide 
whether the damage done to the ceiling tiles in the multipurpose 
room constituted injury to a jail or to some other part of the 
building. Because those issues were open to the jury to decide, 
the issue as to the lesser included offense should also have been 
presented to them. 
FIFTH ISSUE: Section 77-32-1, et. seq., U.C.A., (1953), as 
amended, establishes minimum standards provided by counties for 
the defense of indigent defendants. In Section 77-32-5, U.C.A., 
(1953), as amended, the Legislature provided that the cost of 
transcripts shall be paid by the state, county or municipal 
agency that is prosecuting the defendant at trial. Non-indigent 
defendants may obtain a transcript simply by ordering it from the 
Court Reporter and paying the costs. However, for an indigent 
defendant to obtain a copy of the transcript, it becomes neces-
sary for his court appointed counsel to file a Motion for an 
Order of Production of Transcript and for the payment of the cost 
of the transcript by the governmental entity involved. 
On January 29, 1990, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant filed a 
Verified Motion for Order of Production of the Preliminary Hear-
ing Transcript with the Seventh Judicial District Court. The 
Motion was based on the grounds that a transcript of the Prelimi-
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nary Hearing proceedings was essential to the preparation of 
Defendant's defense. On February 20, 1990, following the ar-
raignment of the Defendant, the District Court ruled on 
Defendant's Motion for Production of the Preliminary Hearing 
Transcript and denied the Motion, informing Counsel for the 
Defendant that if Counsel had taken proper notes, he would not 
need the Preliminary Hearing Transcript. 
In the course of the Preliminary Hearing, Defense Counsel 
must do many things besides taking notes and it is difficult 
while Defense Counsel is questioning a witness to also be writing 
down that witness's answers to questions. It is simply not prac-
tical for a defense attorney to be able to take down, verbatim, 
everything that a witness may say while on the witness stand. 
Defense Counsel is not obligated to explain Defendant's 
defense strategy to the court and the prosecutor prior to trial, 
and Defense Counsel may not even know all the issues that need to 
be explored until after he has reviewed the testimony of witness-
es in the Preliminary Hearing. Defense Counsel should be free to 
make his own decisions as to what he will need to best prepare 
Defendant's defense and the Trial Court should not limit his 
ability to provide effective assistance of counsel for the De-
fendant. 
Among other things, the Preliminary Hearing Transcript is 
valuable in analyzing the State's case, pinpointing inconsisten-
cies between the testimony of various witnesses and impeaching 
the testimony of the State's witnesses during trial. Without the 
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Preliminary Hearing Transcript, inconsistent statements by prose-
cution witnesses cannot be brought to the attention of the jury 
and it is impossible to impeach the testimony of the witnesses. 
By denying Defendant/Appellant access to the Preliminary 
Hearing Transcript, Defendant/Appellant was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel in properly cross-examining some of the 
State's witnesses. Defendant was thus denied his rights under 
Amendment VI of the Constitution of the United States and under 
Article 1, Section 12, of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant is entitled to have his conviction herein reversed 
and the entire case returned to the District Court for. further 
proceedings consistent with the Court's rulings on this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 29TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 1990. 
KEITH H. CHIARA 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that she, on October ^9^L • 
1990, placed the original and eight (8) copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF, in the U.S. mails, postage prepaid, addressed 
as follows: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
and that on said date, she likewise placed four (4) copies 
thereof in the U.S. mails, also postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows: 
Office of the Attorney General 
Room 236 
Utah State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
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Price, UT 84501 
(801) 637-7011 
Attorney ior Defendant GREGORY LYNN JAIMEZ 
114 THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH. 
PI aintiff ; 
5 R E G Q F:N> L Y M N J A I M t. Z , 
Defendant. 
) VERIFIED MOTION FOR ORi)FR 
; FOR PRODUCTION OF TRANSCRIPTS 
) 
) 
; C r i m. No. 9 0 i 0 0 0 u O 4 F S 
De-fendant GREGORY LYNN JAIMEZ hereby moves the Court -."or an 
Orner directing Marilyn Jane Mussel man, Official Court Transcrib-
er, to prepare a transcript o-f the Preliminary Hearing in this 
case, hold January 22, 1990, in the Se/enth Circuit Court o-f 
Carbon County, State o-f Utah, and deliver the transcript to 
Counsel -for Defendant. 
This motion is based on the grounds that a transcript of the 
above described proceedings is essential to the preparation of 
Defendant's defence, and the Court has Determined Defendant to be 
indigent and has appointed Counsel for Defendant. 
DATE r-D this g^C/ day of January, 1990. 
KEITH H. CHIARA 
Attorney ior Defendant 
37 East Main Street 
Price, UT 84501 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF CARBON ) 
On this ...-feT. ci£*y of January, 1990, personally appeared 
be-fore me, KEITH H. CHIARA, who being by me first duly sworn, on 
his oath deposes and say- that, he hc\s read the foregoing state-
ments and declares this to be true r.o the best of his knowledge 
and beli ef„ 
KEITH H. CHIARA 
bub scribed and sworn to before me tnis ^•yj.fj^'h^ day of Janu-
ary, 1990-
NOTARY PUBLIC ' 
My Commission Expires: 9/10/9 3 Residing In: East Carbon, UT 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING. 
I herebv certify that I mailed a copy ot the torscojnq 
VERIFIED MOTION FOR ORDER FOR PRODUCTION OF TRANSCRIPTION to the 
•following at the address set -forth below, postage prepaid, on 
t h l S .J2^L/C-. d a y °* ^eTiLUir Jn 1VVO. 
Gene S t r a t e 
Carbon County A t t o r n e y 
C a r b o n County C o u r t h o u s e 
F r i ere, 'J7 8'lcTiOl 
J^^6JTLLU^^ 
KEITH H. CHIAPA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
37 East M a m St 
P. O. 'Box 955 
Price. (IT 84501 
(801) 637-7011 
March 6, 1°90 
Gene Strate 
Carbon County Attorney 
Carbon County Courthouse 
123 East Main St 
Price, UT 34 501 
RE: Gregory L- Jaimez, Criminal Ho. 901000004 FS. 
Dear Gene: 
By this letter I am requesting discovery in the above case of any 
information you may have in your possession acquired after Janu-
ary 11, 19^0. 
Additionally, I have been informed that one of the other defend-
ants in the above matter submitted a written admission oi his 
guilt and I would, therefore, request any statements in your pos-
session made by any of the other defendants. Rule 16 requires 
that you provide me with any relevant, written or recorded state-
ments of the defendants or co-defendants. 
I, therefore, request any such statements that you may have or be 
aware of. 
KEITH H. CHIARA 
Attorney at Law 
KHC/kj 
I- EITH H. CHIARA 
ATTORNEY AT LAU' 
37 Last Mann Bz 
P. 0. bo)t "55 
p-ice, in n4r.oi 
(80i) to-:?-"7'..)] i 
March 8, J 390 
GEne Strate 
Carocn County Attorney 
Carbon County Counnouse 
113 East N a m St -
Price, UT 33501 
RE: Gregory Lynn Maimer. 
Dear Genes 
I am writing this l«+*tfr as a request for additional discovery. 
As I mentioned to vou in our telephone conversation yesterday, 1 
request discovery concerning the amount of damages to the squad 
room-cultural hall- Please do not include the cost of damage to 
luncheon foods, fine linen, table clotns and candelabra. 
On a serious side, I do request copies of bills relating directly 
to any damage* caused-
Yours truly, 
Attorney at Law 
EITh H. CHlArA 
M T T Q F M E Y AT LHU» 
3~ East hair« St 
p. 0. F.OJC 955 
Price, UT B45'Jl 
(901) D37-7011 
Pitt or n£*y for Defendant 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CflURT ~0F CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
p] aintIff 
GFEGOtf* LY NN JAIhEZ, 
Def end ant. 
VERIFIED MOTION TO SEVER 
Crifiuric-il Mo - 9f>-~ 
MOTION 
CONES NOW, Defendant, bv and through his attorney, I-EITH H. 
CH[ARA, and moves thiF Court to sever the trial of Defendant, 
Gregory Lvnn Jaimer, from l:ne trials of Defendants Jerrv Lee 
Addtrrrn-<n arid ! ennoth harl Smith, pursuant to Section 77-35~Q, 
subparagraph \d), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, :n that 
the prosecution of defendant would be prejudiced by a joinder of 
defendants for the following reasons: 
1. Dependent, Jerry Lee Adderman, has written a letter to 
the editor of the Sun Advocate claiming full responsibility ior 
the damages done to the jail on November 7, 19S9 and stating in 
that letter that the defendant^ Gregory Lynn Jaimez had no in— 
volv^went-
2. Defendant Adderman, since writing this letter, has 
entered a not guilty plea and is contesting the charges and as 
such is entitled to refuse to take the witness stand and testify 
against himself, including refusing to acknowledge the writing of 
tn^ - tetter. 
3. Althougn Counsel -for Defendant: J^i m^r requested all 
exculpatory information at tne Carbon County Attorney, and re-
cently repeated a request in writing of the County Attorney, the 
County Attorney did not di /nine the contents of this lecher to 
Counsel until tndav, March 9, 1990. 
4. Because Counsel was rot made aware o-f this letter and 
its conten-i s until March °, 1^90, Counsel does not hav'p- enouqh 
time to arrange -for a handwriting anal /st or other means of 
inaopenclent evidence to present by the date of trial that the 
letter is wntten by Defendant Adderman. 
5- Because Defendant ndderman has previously filed a demand 
•tor a 120 day disposition of the charges against him, his trial 
must proceed on tne dt>«te scheduled and Defendant fidderman would 
either foe found guilty or not guilty fov the time Defendant 
J aimer s t->ub sequent trial is hold and tnerefore, could he re-
quired to testify at Defendant Jaimez's trial concerning the 
statements made in the letter. 
6. Defendant Jaimez is prejudiced by the joinder o-* his 
trial with the trial of Defendant Adcierman and, therefore, he is 
entitled to a severance in the interest of justice. 
7. Counsel for Defendant Jaimez has reviewed a copy of the 
letter written by Defendant Adderman and attaches a copy to this 
Motion. Counsel has compared the handwriting of Defendant Adder-
man's letter with copies of other letters written by Defendant 
Adderman to the Carbon County Sheriff's Office, Judge Bryner of 
the Seventh Circuit Court and Carbon County Attorney and in 
comparing the style and appearance of the handwriting of the 
various letters it aopears to Counsel tnat Lnt v a'-3011 = letters 
were written bv the same person. 
DATED this 9th dav of March, 1990 
\ EITH H. CHIARM 
attorney for Defendant 
On the 9th day of March., 1990, personal 1 / appeared oefore 
me, f FITH H. CHIARA and verified to me that to his best knowledge 
and 3 n format J on the statements in the above Motion a.r& true and 
correct. 
^d& NOTARY PUBLIC ° 
My Commission E*:pi rrs: _Q-J.dzzJlL.Jl**** cli ng Inn J5~a^„£c.&zLx7n^ HT(U^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 9th dav of March, 1990, I 
mailed a true and correct cony of the above, postage prepaid to 
the following: 
Gene Strate 
Carbon County Attorney 
Carbon County Courthouse 
Price, UT 84501 
Dan I- el 1 er 
Attorney at Lsw 
90 West 100 No. 
Price, UT 84501 
Al1 en Thorpe 
Attorney at Law 
98 East Main 
Castle Dale, UT 84513 
JjSoXhJbuA^ — 
BOX 250 ^ ^ 
DRAPER, UTAH 84020. 
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KEITH H. CHIARA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
37 East Main St: 
P. Q. Box 955 
Price, UT 94 501 
(801) 637-7011 
Attorney for De-fen a ant 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff;; : NOTION FOR CONTINUANCE 
vs. : 
GREGORY LYNN JAIMEZ, s Criminal No. 90-3 
Defendant- : 
NOTTON 
CONES NOW, Defendant, GREGORY LYNN JAIMEZ, by and through 
his Attorney, KEITH H„ CHIARA, and moves this Court -for a contin-
uance o-f the jury trial set for March 14 and 15, 1990, for the 
f ol 1owi ng reasons: 
1. Defendant Jaimez has Tiled a Motion to Sever his trial 
from the trial of Defendant Jerry Lee Adderman because Adderman 
has previously admitted in writing to have been the only defend-
ant responsible iar the damage done in the jail on November 7, 
1989, but has since pleaded not guilty, arid cannot be forced to 
take the witness stand to testify concerning the letter. 
2. Adderman has demanded an early trial setting and his 
trial should be heard before Defendant Jaimez's trial so that 
Adderman uan be required to testi-fy in the defense o-f De-fendant 
Jaimez. 
DATED this 9th day of March 
KEITH H. CHIARA 
Attorney for Defendant 
W&L^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day o-f March, 1990, I 
mailed a true and correct copy o-f the abo/e Motion postage pre-
paid, to the folLOHinq: 
Gene Citrate 
Carbon Countv Attorney 
Carbon Countv Courthouse 
Price, UT 84501 
Ai 1 en Tr i or pe 
attorney at Law 
93 East'Main St. 
Castle Dale, UT Q45i: 
Dan !• el 1 er 
Attorney at Law 
90 West 100 So. 
Price, UT 84501 
^aUv-2-A.ty**.. 
KEITH H. CHIARA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
37 EAST MAIN ST 
P. 0. BOX 955 
PRICE, UT 84501 
(801) 637-701 1 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
GREGORY LYNN JAIMEZ, 
De fendant. 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
Crim. No. 90-3 
MOTION 
COMES NOW, the defendant, by and through his attorney, Keith 
H. Chiara, and moves this honorable court for an Order prohibiting 
the Carbon County Attorney or any of the witnesses for the State of 
Utah, in the above entitled matter, from making any reference to 
the alleged statements made by defendant to Carbon County Sheriff 
Deputy Jeral Cowan or to others connected with the Carbon County 
Sheriff's Office, about Deputy Cowan's wife. Said statements were 
alleged to have been made by defendant on on about November 75 1989. 
Those statements are.irrelevant to the above case, are not prob-
ative of defendant's guilt or innocencecin the above matter, and 
would tend to arouse emotions in the minds of the jurors that would 
prejudice them against the defendant. Those statements are not ad-
missions of guilt, nor are the statements necessarily linked to the 
actions defendant is alleged to have committed that resulted in the 
above entitled matter, and no reference to said statements should be 
admitted« 
DATED t h i s ML day of M a r c h , 1990 
mrc VLs 
KEITH H. CHIARA 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that I hand-delivered a true and correct copy of 
the above Motion to the following persons on the 14th day of March, 
1990. 
Gene Strate 
Carbon County Attorney 
Carbon County Courthouse 
Price, UT 84501 
Dan Keller 
Attorney at Law 
90 West 100 North 
Price, UT 84501 
«L 2 
KEITH H. CHIARA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
37 East Main St 
P. 0- Box 955 
Price, LIT 64501 
(SOI) 637-7011 
Attorney -for De-fend ant 
IM THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff:; 
vs. 
GREGORY LYNN JAIME!, 
De-f endant. 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Criminal No. 90-3 
COMES HDV} the Defendant and requests that the Uourt give the 
requested jury instructions. 
DATED this 13th day o-f March, 1990. 
KEITH H. CHIARA 
Attorney at Law 
DELIVERED a copy o-f the -foregoing Requested Jury Instruc-
tions to Gene Strate, Carbon County Attorney, 123 East Main St., 
Price, Utah, 84501, this 15th day o-f March, 1990. 
. r (STRUCT I ON ho. 
\ou are instructed that i f von -find -From the evidence that 
damage was done to the jail or other place o-f confinement, that 
before that damage is considered sufficient to te considered an 
"injury" to the jan1, that damage must be of equal gravity or 
consequence with "breaiing aown", "pulling down" or "destroying" 
a jail or other place of confinement. 
INSTRUCTION No. 
V'DU are instructed that if \'ou oo not find the Defendant 
guilty of injuring jails, you may find the Defendant guilty of a 
lesser included offense of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, a Class A Misde-
meanor . 
To find the Defendant guilty of Criminal Mischief, you must 
find, bevond a reasonable doubt, the following elements of that 
crime: 
i. That the Defendant, on or about the 7th day of November, 
1989, 
2. Intentionally damaged, or defaced the property of anoth-
er, 
3. The dollar amount of the damage was not shown by any 
evidence, to be more than -£5'X).00. 
